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HEN IT COMES TO THE QUESTION OF WHICH RULES of
international law apply to international straits in times of naval
armed conflict, one has to distinguish between straits bordered by at least one
of the parties to an international armed conflict and straits bordered by States
that are not directly involved in the hostilities. Although the law of maritime
neutrality-let alone the general law of neutrality-is far from settled, the
latter situation will, for reasons of convenience, be described as the legal status
of neutral straits. 1
Straits are comparatively narrow natural passageways between one part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas,
or exclusive economiczone. 2 Artificial passageways must be distinguished from
straits. In particular, they are not governed by the international law applicable
to straits, but rather (and if at all) by special treaty provisions. That being so, for
the purposes of the present study it is important to note the following
provisions.
• With respect to the Panama Canal, the Treaty of 7 September 19773
provides that "in time of peace and in time of war it shall remain secure and
open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire
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equality.... Vessels of war and auxiliary vessels of all nations shall at all times
be entitled to transit the Canal, irrespective of their internal operation, means
of propulsion, origin, destination or armament."4
• Pursuant to the Treaty of Constantinople of29 October 1888,5 "the Suez
maritime canal shall always be free and open, in time of war and in time of
peace, to every vessel of commerce or war, without distinction of the flag."6
• Pursuant to Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Kiel Canal is open
to all vessels flying the flags of States not at war with Germany. 7

The Legal Status of Belligerent International Straits
As far as international straits of the parties to an international armed
conflict are concerned, neither those not completely overlapped by territorial
sea nor straits governed by "long,standing international conventions," will be
dealt with here in depth. 8 In the case of the former, a route through the high
seas or through an exclusive economic zone will usually exist. Hence, littoral
States are not bound by the special rules and principles applicable to
international straits.9 In the case of the latter, there is only one international
convention explicitly dealing with the situation of a littoral State being party to
an ongoing armed conflict.1o According to Articles 1, 2,4, and 5 of the 20 July
1936 Montreux Convention, all neutral vessels enjoy the right of transit
passage, as long as they travel through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by
daytime, refrain from supporting Turkey's enemies, and respect sea lanes
designated by the Turkish authorities. However, there is no provision
restricting the transit right of Turkish warships. Rather, Article 20 provides:
En temps de guerre, la Turquie etant belligerante, les dispositions des articles 10

a 18 ne seront pas applicables; Ie passage des batiments de guerre sera
entierement laisse ala discretion du Gouvemement turc.
Thus if Turkey is a belligerent the same rules apply as in international straits
not governed by a special treaty regime.

Suspension of the Right of Transit Passage in Time of Armed Conflict? The
territorial seas of the parties to an international armed conflict are part of the
general area of hostilities. Therefore, at first glance there seem to exist no
restrictions on the conduct of hostilities in and over international straits
completely overlapped by the territorial seas of the parties to an international
armed conflict. Indeed, subject to the applicable maritime jus in bello, enemy
vessels and aircraft in such straits may be attacked, and enemy and neutral
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merchant vessels may be visited, stopped, and captured. ll Of particular
note, the littoral State is entitled to deny all enemy vessels and aircraft the
right of transit passage. 12 In view of the economic interests involved,13
however, it is a matter of dispute whether such straits may also be closed to
the shipping of States not parties to the conflict, i.e., neutral shipping. 14
In the course of the deliberations at the 1907 Second Hague Peace
Conference on Convention VIII, a proposal by the Netherlands on a
comprehensive prohibition of mining international straits was rejected. 1s
Another, seeking a prohibition on the complete closing of an international
strait by mines, also failed. 16 Therefore, although a number of delegates
expressed sympathy for such proposals, Hague Convention VIII lacks any
provision on the mining of international straitsY During the Second World
\Var, numerous international straits were mined. 1s Yet during the first two
years of the war this closure was not complete. In the respective proclamations
of danger zones, either peaceful shipping was referred to or piloting services or
safe passages were designated, thus enabling peaceful shipping to transit the
straits relatively unmolested. 19 Still, in view of the total character of this war in
the years following, these examples are insufficient to prove the existence of a
prohibition on entirely closing international straits. State practice after 1945
also reveals that if States bordering an international strait are parties to an
international armed conflict, they are inclined to close it even to peaceful
shipping; they are not prepared to tolerate the dangers otherwise involved. 20
It seems, however, that a total closure of international straits, especially
by naval mines, is inconsistent with the 9 April 1949 judgement of the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel caseY As is well
known, the Court, in view of the state of war alleged by Greece,
acknowledged Albania's right to restrict the passage of warships. It
emphasized, however, that this may not lead to "prohibiting such passage or
subjecting it to requirements of special authorization. lin Recent state
practice also indicates the existence of a rule prohibiting the suspension of
the right of transit passage, even during an international armed conflict. At
the beginning of the first Gulf War, Iran explicitly acknowledged its legal
duty to keep open those parts of the Strait of Hormuz23 overlapped by its
territorial sea.24 When Iran proclaimed a war zone in that sea area and
closed it to international shipping, the international community, because of
the overall importance of this strait for international oil trade, reacted with
vehement protests. 25 In particular, the United States maintained that the
right of transit passage remains unaffected by the fact that the bordering
States are involved in an international armed conflict. 26
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These statements and protests imply that the right of transit passage through
and over international straits as laid down in Article 38 of the UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) is both customary in character and
binding upon States parties to an international armed conflict. 27 Further
evidence in favor of the customary character of a comprehensive and
non;suspendable right of transit passage is Article 16, paragraph 4, of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 28
According to that provision there "shall be no suspension of the innocent
passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or
the territorial sea of a foreign State." Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the
right of transit passage applies especially to straits that have lost their high seas
character because of an expansion of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles. 29
In all likelihood, without compensation in the form of the right of transit passage,
the legal status of international straits would not have been settled.30 Finally, the
Commander's Handbook of the U.S. Navy (N\VP 1;14M) provides that naval
mines may be employed "to channelize neutral shipping, but not in a manner to
deny transit passage of international straits [.•.] by such shipping.,,3!
On the other hand, it must be remembered that some States neither
acknowledge the customary character of Article 38 of the LOS Convention,32
nor agree with its applicability in times of armed conflict. At the beginning of the
deliberations on the Convention, a number of delegations, while pleading for a
transit right for vessels in international straits, were hesitant to accept a right of
overflight as well.33 In contrast to NWP 1;14M, the German Handbook, in
section 1042 on mining, provides that "the shipping lanes of neutral and
non;belligerent States shall be kept open to an appropriate extent, if military
circumstances so permit.,,34 This view is obviously shared by Denmark.35
It follows from the foregoing that State practice is conclusive only to the extent
that, in principle, neutral vessels, i.e., warships and merchant vessels,36 may not be
denied the right of transit passage (or of non;suspendable innocent passage) in
international straits belonging to the parties to an international armed conflict.37
However, there is also a tendency towards restriction of this right.38 Unfortunately,
it is far from clear under which conditions the littoral belligerent State should be
allowed to so restrict it. Of course, one possibility is denial to neutral submarines of
the right to transit a belligerent strait submerged.39 This restriction could be
justified by the legitimate interest of the belligerent littoral States in being fully
informed of sea traffic in its coastal waters. The interests of the neutral flag States
would be infringed upon only insignificantly, especially in view of the technical
difficulties of identifying submerged objects.40 Still, because of its inconclusiveness,
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no further conclusions relating to restrictions on the neutral States' right of
transit passage can be drawn from State practice. In any event, the reasons
justifying any limitation of this right must be of considerable weight-for
example, overwhelming considerations of national securityY This follows from
the fact that the law of both naval warfare and maritime neutrality has to be
considered to be of an exceptional legal order.42

The Right of Overflight. The foregoing principles cannot, as such, be applied to
the right of overflight that Article 38.1 of the LOS Convention includes in
transit passageY While NWP 1-14M contains a prohibition of entirely mining
international straits, no provision addresses closure of the airspace above an
international strait.44 Of course, enemy military aircraft entering the airspace
above an international strait overlapped by the belligerent coastal State's
territorial sea may be attacked, and enemy civilian aircraft may be forced to
land and be subjected to capture.45 In principle, neutral aircraft are entitled to
continue with their normal operations, but if they enter that airspace they do so
at their own risk.46 Still, an unlimited application of the peacetime rules on
overflight in time of armed conflict would meet considerable practical
difficulties. Aircraft move much faster than ships. The Vincennes incident is but
one demonstration of the difficulties involved in the identification of aircraft
within a limited period of time.47 In view of the potential threat posed by
aircraft, parties to an international armed conflict will hardly be willing to allow
neutral air traffic to continue using the airspace above their international
straits. Hence, there seem to be good reasons for a belligerent right to restrict or
even suspend the right of overflight by neutral air traffic in the airspace above
international straits in time of armed conflict. Indeed, in State practice there
are some indications that during an international armed conflict coastal States
reserve a right to close entirely the airspace above international straits
overlapped by their territorial seas. 4S This practice, however, is not sufficient to
prove either the nonexistence or existence of an unlimited right of overflight by
neutral aircraft in time of armed conflict. Therefore, the legality of a restriction
of transit passage by neutral aircraft can only be judged, ifit can be judged at all,
ex post in light of the jus ad bellum.

The Legal Status of Neutral International Straits

Neutral International Straits to Which the Right of Transit Passage Applies.
The Second Hague Peace Conference. The legal status of neutral international
straits was dealt with aHhe Second Hague Peace Conference, in the context of
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the rights and duties of neutral States in naval war. In 1894, the Institut de
Droit International had proposed a rule according to which "les detroits qui
servent de passage d'une mer libre aune autre mer libre, ne peuvent jamais etre
fermes." The Swedish delegate to the Second Hague Peace Conference
referred to that proposal in these terms: "Si Ie droit des neutres d'interdire
l'acd!s de ses eaux territoriales aux navires de guerre et aux prises est consacre
comme Ie porte la proposition britannique article 30, il faudrait ajouter a cette
disposition une exception du meme contenu que la resolution de l'Institut.,,4'l
The Danish delegate proposed an amendment by which the provisions of
Hague Convention XIII were not to be understood "de fa!;on a prohiber en
temps de guerre Ie passage simple des eaux neutres, unissant deux mers libres
par un navire de guerre ou navire auxiliaire d'un belligerant.,,5o Both proposals
were aimed at denying neutral States the right to close their territorial seas if
they formed part of an international strait. The contrary view was taken by the
Ottoman and Japanese delegates, who wanted to treat international straits in
the same manner as other coastal waters.51 In the end, the legal status of
neutral international straits remained unsettled, even though the Third
Committee in its report to the plenary had come to the conclusion that "la
formule adoptee ... ne tranche nullement les questions precedentes, laissees
sous l' empire du droit des gens general.,,52 Still, it is doubtful that by 1907 a rule
to that effect was in existence.s3 Although only Japan had explicitly rejected a
prohibition on closing neutral international straits, the lack of willingness
amongst the other delegates to agree upon a special provision on straits cannot
be ignored.54
State Practice. State practice during international armed conflicts before
1945 was also inconclusive with regard to the existence of a general and
comprehensive legal duty of neutral States to keep their international straits
open.55 Only the Scandinavian States allowed belligerent merchant vessels and
warships to transit their international straits and, if they had laid mines there,
offered piloting services.56 In addition, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
and Sweden, in the Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar Rules of
Neutrality of 27 May 1938,57 promised to keep their international straits open
to belligerent warships.58 These examples are insufficient to prove the
existence of a customary rule.59 On the contrary, other States, like Germany,
believed that there existed no rule of customary or treaty law obliging neutral
States to let belligerent merchant vessels freely transit neutral international
straits.6o
Relevant state practice since 1945 is also predominantly restricted to
Scandinavian States,61 which, by acts of national legislation, have more or less
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clearly shown their willingness to keep their international straits open for
belligerent warships, merchant vessels, and aircraft.62 Some authors claim the
existence of a general rule of customary law to that effect.63 Unfortunately, they
ignore the fact that such a claim must be based on a general practice
accompanied by a corresponding opinio juris. Moreover, the question of
whether the transit of belligerent warships is in accordance with the neutral
status of the littoral State has to be clearly distinguished from that of whether a
neutral State is entitled to deny transit through or over its international strait
to belligerent warships, merchant vessels, or aircraft. Therefore, despite
assertions to the contrary, one must conclude that until the end of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1982,
there existed no customary rule prohibiting the total closure of international
straits by neutral coastal States.
The Influence of the International Law of the Sea. So far, we have not taken
into consideration the progressive development of the international law on
international straits initiated by the codifications of the law of the sea,
especially by the LOS Convention. As already mentioned, Article 16.4 of the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
provides that there "shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign
ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one
part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a
foreign State."64 Since it was up to the coastal State to determine the
innocence of passage, the question arose of whether it was entitled to require
foreign warships to leave the strait should they fail to comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State. Other unresolved issues include the right of
submarines to transit straits submerged and the duty of foreign military aircraft
to obtain prior admittance from the coastal State for overflight.65
These problems were partly solved by UNCLOS III, especially because
extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles did not allow the issue of
international straits to be left unregulated.66 Now the right of transit passage
applies in international straits that are overlapped by the territorial seas of the
littoral States.67 According to Article 38.2 of the LOS Convention, transit
passage that "shall not be impeded"6S is "the exercise of the freedom of
navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious
transit of the strait." While exercising the right of transit passage, ships and
aircraft must proceed without delay; refrain from any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the
bordering State, or in any other manner violate the principles of international
law embodied in the United Nations Charter; and limit activities to those
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incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit, unless
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress. 69 Moreover, according to
Article 39.2, ships in transit shall comply with "generally accepted
international regulations, procedures and practices" for safety at sea and for the
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships. This means that
they are obliged to observe the conventions concluded under the auspices of
the International Maritime Organization (IMO).70 Aircraft in transit passage
shall observe the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO).71 Finally, the littoral State is entitled to
designate sea lanes and to prescribe traffic separation schemes.72 However,
such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact among
foreign ships, or in their application have the practical effect of denying or
impairing the right of transit passageY This implies that the right of transit
passage will remain unaffected, even if the vessel or aircraft in transit passage
violates the regulations adopted by the littoral State.74
In view of the customary character of these provisions, we may draw the
conclusion that warships and military aircraft enjoy an unimpeded right of
transit passage.75 Submarines, because of the reference to "normal modes" in
Article 39.1 (c), may transit international straits submerged.76 The littoral
States' duty not to infringe upon this right is incumbent on them not only in
time of peace but also during an international armed conflict at sea if they are
not parties. 77 If the parties to an international armed conflict may restrict or
suspend the right of transit passage only in exceptional cases, then, a fortiori,
States not parties to the conflict must be subject to even stricter limitations.
This conclusion is verified by recent State practice. During the Iran,Iraq
conflict, transit through or over the Strait of Hormuz by the Iranian and the
Iraqi armed forces was in no way restricted by Oman. The military manuals of
the U.S. Navy,78 Canada,79 and the Federal Republic of GermanyBo also provide
that neutral States are not entitled to restrict or suspend the transit of
belligerent warships and military aircraft, or to submit them to stricter
regulations than those applicable to vessels and aircraft of other States.B1
Moreover, the continuing validity of the right of transit passage is an
appropriate means to meet the object and purpose of the law of neutrality.82
Hence, Rauch correctly states:
One of the advantages of the new transit passage concept is that it keeps the
littoral States bordering straits with great strategic value out of the vicious circle
of escalation in times of tension and crisis. If transit through such straits were
subject to the discretion of the coastal States, they would unavoidably become
involved, even if the discretionary power were to be exercised evenhandedly, i.e.,
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even if they meticulously abided by the rule that all restrictions or prohibitions
have to be applied impartially to the belligerents. The ramifications of a refusal or
of a permission of transit in whole or in part--e.g., only surface navigation, or
surface and submerged navigation, or navigation and overflight-could, albeit
legally non.discriminatory, in fact be of quite different military and strategic
value to the parties to the conflict.83

As in time of peace, however, belligerent warships in transit must properly
respect designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes and must proceed
without delay.s4 They may not carry out any research or survey activities
without the prior authorization of the bordering States.55 The prohibition on
the threat or use of force against the littoral State is complemented by the
relevant prohibitions of the law of maritime neutrality as laid down in the 1907
Hague Convention XllI and as found in customary law.s6 In particular,
belligerent warships and military aircraft may neither take hostile actions nor
use these sea areas as a base of operations.S7 Military aircraft must respect safety
regulations and have due regard for the safety of air traffic.B8 In view of their
sovereign immunity, belligerent warships are not bound by the provisions of the
LOS Convention on the protection of the marine environment.
While submarines may pass through neutral international straits submerged,
it is not quite clear which additional measures belligerent warships and military
aircraft in transit may take.89 According to the Canadian Draft Manual, they
may transit a neutral strait "in an appropriate state of readiness with
appropriate sensors activated.,,90 NWP I-14M provides that "belligerent forces
in transit may, however, take defensive measures consistent with their security,
including the launching and recovery of aircraft, screen formation steaming,
and acoustic and electronic surveillance.,,91 Military aircraft may "engage in
activities that are consistent with their security and the security of
accompanying surface and subsurface forces.,,92 The same rules can be found in
the San Remo Manua1. 93 The use of acoustic and electronic sensors must be
considered a normal activity of warships and military aircraft, especially during
armed conflict, an activity that is not to be equated with "research and survey
activities" in the sense of Article 40 of the LOS Convention. Otherwise, their
security would be intolerably jeopardized.94
There remain some doubts as to whether the other measures mentioned in
section 7.3.5 ofNWP I-14M are compatible with the duty of continuous and
expeditious transit.95 Since there is no relevant State practice that would allow
conclusions regarding the current state of the law, one cannot but consider
such activities as in accordance with the applicable law if they do not:
(1) endanger the safety of navigation within the strait; (2) present a threat or
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use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political
independence of the neutral littoral State in a way incompatible with the laws
of neutrality; or (3) unreasonably exceed what is necessary for a continuous
and expeditious transit. 96 As regards the use of military aircraft, this may not
result in a use of neutral waters or airspace as a base of operations. Thus,
attacks may not be conducted by military aircraft launched from warships
within neutral international straits.97 Within and over neutral territorial seas,
all hostile actions by belligerent forces are prohibited. The fact that parts of a
neutral's territorial sea form an international strait does not alter anything. The
right of transit passage implies only that the neutral littoral State is prohibited
from closing an international strait to belligerent warships and military aircraft;
it does not mean that the coastal State's sovereignty is no longer protected.
It needs to be emphasized that the foregoing principles only apply to
offensive operations. As seen, according to NWP 1,14M and the San Remo
Manual "defensive measures consistent with their security" would not be
contrary to the inviolability of the neutral State's sovereignty. During the
discussions on the San Remo Manual there "seemed to be general agreement
that because of the dangers of unlawful attack on a transiting unit by an
opposing belligerent which might ignore its duty to respect the neutrality of the
State bordering the strait, . . . the transiting unit should be allowed to go
through in a high state of readiness and should be able to adopt the defensive
measures necessary for the self,defence of the unit or force.,,98
Unfortunately, the participants were unable to be more concrete about this
issue. There is, however, another rule in the San Remo Manual that is of help
in evaluating the legality of defensive measures taken in neutral waters,
including neutral international straits. Paragraph 22 provides:
Should a belligerent State be in violation of the regime of neutral waters ... the
neutral State is under an obligation to take the measures necessary to terminate
the violation. If the neutral State fails to terminate the violation of its neutral
waters by a belligerent, the opposing belligerent must so notify the neutral State
and give the neutral State a reasonable time to terminate the violation by the
belligerent. If the violation of the neutrality of the State by the belligerent
constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the security of the opposing
belligerent and the violation is not terminated, then that belligerent may, in the
absence of any feasible and timely alternative, use such force as is strictly
necessary to respond to the threat posed by the violation.

Accordingly, belligerent warships and military aircraft transiting a neutral
international strait are allowed to take all measures necessary for self,defense
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as acknowledged by customary international law if the neutral littoral State is
either unwilling or unable to terminate the violation of its neutrality. Thus, the
sovereignty of the neutral State and the belligerents' interests are equally met.

Neutral International Straits to Which the Right of Transit Passage Does Not
Apply. The rules and principles dealt with so far undoubtedly apply to
international straits overlapped by the territorial seas of neutral coastal States.
However, according to the LOS Convention the right of transit passage is not
valid in all straits which-either in general or in specific maritime
parlance-are used for international navigation. The exceptions have
repercussions for the law of maritime neutrality, because they concern sea areas
covered by the territorial sovereignty of the neutral coastal State.

Exceptions

to

the Right of Transit Passage According to the LOS Convention.

Straits used for international navigation between a part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea or historical bay of a foreign
State are governed only by the right of innocent passage. 1OO Although
according to Article 45.2 of the LOS Convention there "shall be no suspension
of innocent passage through such straits," the coastal State will be in a position
to impose stricter limitations on international navigation than if the transit
passage regime applied. The decisive differences are that foreign submarines
may not transit such straits submerged and that foreign aircraft are prohibited
from entering the airspace above them, unless the coastal State explicitly
consents.
Another explicit exception to the transit passage regime is laid down in
Article 36 of the LOS Convention; it applies "if there exists through the strait a
route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics."
If an international strait is not-at least in part-completely overlapped by the
territorial sea of the coastal States, ships and aircraft of all nations enjoy
freedom of navigation and overflight in the remaining corridor even if an
exclusive economic zone has been proclaimed. Such a situation is encountered
in all straits whose breadth exceeds twenty~four nautical miles measured from
properly drawn baselines. In straits whose breadth is less than twenty~four
nautical miles there may also exist a high seas (or EEZ) corridor if the coastal
States claim a territorial sea ofless than twelve nautical miles. 101 Within those
portions of the strait that are part of the coastal State's territorial sea, ships and
aircraft only enjoy a suspendable right of innocent passage. 102
At first glance, the provisions of Article 36 seem rather clear. However,
their practical application sometimes poses difficult problems. It needs to be
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emphasized that the existence of a high seas or EEZ corridor as such does not
exclude the applicability of the transit passage regime. The route must be "of
similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical
characteristics." If the remaining corridor does not meet these qualifications,
the transit passage regime will also apply in straits not overlapped by the
territorial sea of the bordering State. I03 But when is the corridor "of similar
convenience"? In view of the wording of Article 36, this will not be the case if
the navigational channel is not identical with the remaining corridor or when
transiting through the corridor would result in navigational difficulties or a loss
of time. 104
The latter aspect is also of importance with regard to overflight. If the
corridor, due to the geographic configuration of the bordering coastlines, often
changes its direction, military aircraft in particular will hardly be able to follow
it exactly. This problem is not resolved by demanding that pilots decelerate,
because, should they do so, their aircraft would be more vulnerable to surface
to air missiles. Hence, the coastal State will have to tolerate flights over those
parts of the strait overlapped by its territorial sea. I05
Of course, some will counter these arguments by denying a neutral State's
duty to have regard for belligerent military considerations. The neutral coastal
State is, they would argue, obliged to tolerate transit through and over its
territorial sea only if necessary for the safety of international air and sea traffic.
If a belligerent is not prepared to assume the risks resulting, e.g., from slow
flight, it must simply refrain from using the neutral airspace. The
counterarguments have some validity in time of peace. Although the
relationship between belligerents and neutrals is to a considerable extent
governed by the law of peace, the modification thereof by the laws of neutrality
may not be ignored. The object and purpose of the law of neutrality is to protect
the neutral against the effects of hostilities and to prevent it from becoming
(directly) involved in the armed conflict. The parties to the conflict will
scarcely be willing to limit their operations to corridors that are not of "similar
convenience." The neutral State would be obliged to react, possibly by military
means, to the use of its airspace. Of course, there remains no specific rule of
maritime neutrality which would permit belligerent aircraft to overfly neutral
territorial seas in those international straits through which there are high seas
or exclusive economic zone routes of similar convenience as defined by Article
36. However, functional considerations seem to justify the conclusion that
belligerent warships and military aircraft are entitled to transit such straits in
and over the neutral coastal State's territorial sea. 106
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The third kind of strait excluded from the application of the regime of
transit passage is dealt with in Article 38.1 of the LOS Convention. This
exception, generally called the Messina Exception because it has its origin in a
corresponding endeavour by Italy, applies to a strait that "is formed by an island
of a State bordering the strait and its mainland."lo7 In such a case, transit
passage shall not apply "if there exists seaward of the island a route through the
high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with
respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics."l08 However,
according to Article 45 all ships enjoy the right of innocent passage in such
straits. Although States bordering a strait like that of Messina will regularly try
to exclude the right of transit passage, they will be entitled to do so only if the
conditions laid down in Article 38.1 are met. lOO For example, even in the Strait
of Messina there is no unlimited right to prevent ships and aircraft from
transiting. 110 Othenvise, ships and aircraft travelling from France to the
southern and southeastern Mediterranean would be compelled to take the
route around Sicily, which is about sixty nautical miles longer than the passage
through the Strait of Messina. It can hardly be said that that route is of "similar
convenience."
Straits Governed by Long~Standing International Conventions. Finally-and
this is a continuing cause for dispute-according to Article 35(c) of the LOS
Convention the regime of transit passage does not apply to straits "in which
passage is regulated in whole or in part by long~standing international
conventions in force specifically relating to such straits."l11 There is no
indication in the Convention as to which straits qualify for this exception. Still,
according to the view taken here, only six international straits, if any at all, are
regulated by such conventions: ll2 the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and
Dardanelles), the Strait of Magellan, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Sound and the
Belts, and the Aland Islands Strait. 1l3
It is beyond any doubt that in the Turkish Straits the right of transit passage
does not apply, 114 for there are specific rules with regard to transit passage in the
Montreux Convention of20 July 1936.115 In time of peace and in time of war,
merchant vessels of all nations enjoy an unrestricted right of passage through
the Dardanelles, the Marmara Sea, and the Bosporus. 116 Article 23 limits the
right of overflight to civil aircraft. Accordingly, military aircraft may not enter
airspace above the Straits, either in time of peace or war.
Special provisions apply to warships; further, the Convention distinguishes
between warships belonging to States bordering the Turkish Straits and those
belonging to other States.ll7 In principle, all warships are obliged to inform the
Turkish authorities in advance, by notification of the names, types, and
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numbers of the ships and of the date of passage.u s Prior to passage the
commander must also provide information about the nature of weapons aboard
his ship. No more than nine ships may transit the Straits simultaneously. The
aggregate tonnage of the ships may not exceed fifteen thousand tons unless
they belong to a State bordering the Straits. If they exceed fifteen thousand
tons, the ships may only transit alone or in the company of two cruisers (or
destroyers). The total tonnage of warships in the Black Sea belonging to States
not bordering that sea may amount to thirty thousand tons (or, in the event of
significant disparity between fleets, a maximum of forty,five thousand tons).
All warships transiting the Straits are prohibited from launching their aircraft.
Submarines may not transit, unless they belong to bordering States and
originate from areas beyond the Black Sea. Such submarines may only transit
alone, during the day, and on the surface. Laid down in Articles 10 through 18,
these provisions on warships apply both in time of peace and, ifT urkey is not a
belligerent, in time of war. 119 Warships belonging to the parties to an
international armed conflict are strictly prohibited from transiting the Turkish
Straits. 120
While the Turkish Straits do indeed match the conditions laid down in
Article 35(c) of the LOS Convention, the other straits mentioned do noti
however, they clearly qualify as being governed by "long,standing international
conventions" in the sense of that provision. Freedom of navigation in the Strait
of Magellan is dealt with in the Boundary Treaty between Argentina and Chile
of 23 July 1881.121 That treaty was concluded due to an arbitral award by
Edward VII. According to Article V, the Strait of Magellan is permanently
neutralized, and ships of all nations enjoy an unrestricted right of freedom of
navigation. In Article 10 of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of 18 October 1984,
Argentina and Chile, explicitly referring to the treaty of 1881, agreed in as
follows: 122
The delimitation herein agreed in no way alters what is laid down in the
Boundary Treaty of 1881, whereby the Strait of Magellan is neutralized in
perpetuity and unrestricted navigation in it is assured for the flags of all
nations ....

Since there is no provision in these treaties specifically regulating "passage,"
some argue that Article 35 (c) is not applicable and that therefore the Magellan
Strait is governed by the right of transit passage. l23 However, the missing
reference to "passage" should not be overestimated. Rather, "navigation" is to
be understood as comprising passage. 124 This is one of the reasons why, for
example, the United States acknowledges that the Strait of Magellan falls
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under the 35 (c) exception. 125 Thus, according the Treaty of 1881 (not Article
38 of the LOS Convention), warships and merchant vessels of all nations enjoy
an unlimited right of passage through the Strait of Magellan at all times.
Since there is no reference to aircraft in either the 1881 or 1984 treaties, it is
a matter of contention whether aircraft of all nations also enjoy the right of
non,suspendable overflight. Although Argentina and Chile are seemingly
unwilling to accept such a right, in light of long,standing practice a rule of
customary law to that effect has evolved.126 Therefore, it may be concluded
that although the regime of transit passage as such does not apply to the Strait
of Magellan, ships (according to the Treaty of1881) and aircraft (according to
customary law) of all nations enjoy the right of non,suspendable passage and
overflight.
As regards the Strait of Gibraltar, the passage of ships is subject to
agreements between France, Spain, and the United Kingdom of 1904, 1907,
and 1912.127 There is, however, no indication in those treaties that the parties
also intended either to guarantee or exclude passage by ships of third StatesPS
When they were concluded, the high seas, including the high seas corridor
between Gibraltar and North Africa, could not be made subject to bilateral or
multilateral international treaties. Nevertheless, Spain has repeatedly
maintained that the Strait of Gibraltar is regulated by the Declaration of 1904
and is therefore exempted from at least the right of overflight. 129 It is interesting
to note that during the Yom Kippur War (1973), U.S. military aircraft on
flights from the Azores to Israel scrupulously kept to the airspace above the
high seas corridor between the former three,nautical,mile territorial seas of
Spain and Morocco. 130 In 1973, however, the regime of transit passage was still
unknown. Four years after the adoption of the LOS Convention, U.S. military
aircraft launched from Britain to attack targets in Libya flew over the Strait of
Gibraltar. The United States justified the overflight based on the Convention's
right of transit passage. l3l Hence, neither the treaties referred to nor State
practice allows the conclusion that the Strait of Gibraltar is a strait within the
meaning of Article 35 (C).132 So far, only Spain has taken a view to the contrary.
Since it did not protest the 1986 overflight by U.S. military aircraft, the Spanish
position has no influence on the legal characterization of the Strait of
Gibraltar.
With respect to passage through the Baltic Straits (Sound, Great and Little
Belt), it may be doubted here too whether it is regulated by "long,standing
international conventions." Denmark has repeatedly referred to the Treaty on
the Redemption of Sound Dues of 14 March 1857 133 and to the U.S.,Danish
Treaty of 1 April 1857 134 to maintain that those straits are not governed by
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Article 34 ff. of the LOS Convention.135 Accordingly, by the Ordinance of 27
February 1976 Denmark has subjected transit by warships and overflight by
military aircraft to prior notice and prior admittance respectively. While in
principle all States observe these regulations,136 they have emphasized that the
1857 treaties were never applied to warships.137 Rauch takes the position that
passage in the Baltic Straits is not regulated, either in whole or in part, by the
treaty of 14 March 1857. He therefore maintains that the straits are governed
by the right of transit passage in accordance with Part III of the LOS
Convention.138 Indeed, the Treaty on the Redemption of Sound Dues contains
only an indirect reference to the customary freedom of navigation. On the
other hand, in the U.S.,Danish Treaty of 1 April 1857 "the free and
unencumbered navigation of American vessels, through the Sound and the
Belts forever" is guaranteed. Ultimately, there is little need for a final solution
to this problem, since such a solution would not clarify a situation in which
Denmark was neutral. Even if one were prepared to characterize the Danish
Straits as regulated by "long,standing conventions," doing so would not
necessarily imply that a neutral Denmark would be entitled to close them to
belligerent warships and military aircraft. Instead, the practice of Scandinavian
States already referred to above justifies the assumption that Denmark will
keep its straits open in the event of neutrality.139 As regards Sweden and transit
through the 0resund, that assumption is strengthened by the Swedish
Ordinance of 17 June 1982, which expressly excludes warships and military
aircraft from the right of transit passage restrictions. 140 This means that
Sweden, although considering the 0resund a historical strait,141 acknowledges
the continuing validity of the right of passage and overflight by belligerent
warships and military aircraft in naval armed conflict. Hence, the Danish
restrictions on passage and overflight do not apply when the bordering States
are neutrals.
Finally, Sweden142 and Finland143 maintain that the Aland Islands Strait, in
light of the 3 March 1918 Treaty of Brest,Litovsk and the 20 October 1921
Treaty Concerning the Non,Fortification and Neutralization of the Aland
Islands, is excluded from the regime of transit passage laid down in Part III of
the LOS Convention. Indeed, according to Article 5 of the 1921 treaty the
right of passage is not restricted but is, instead, subject to the rules of
international law and to international practice. The question, therefore, is
whether a specific regulation of passage exists. In that regard, Rauch takes the
following position:
Unless one is to throw overboard all rules of treaty interpretation as codified in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, it is impossible to

278

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg
construe Art. 5 of the Aland Convention as a treaty provision "regulating"
passage through that strait. l44

Obviously, Rauch is in favor of a very narrow understanding of the notion
"regulated" in Article 35 (c) of the LOS Convention, since he is prepared to
accept only explicit restrictions or prohibitions. This notion, however, need not
necessarily be understood so restrictively. It may well suffice that the provisions
in question deal with passage at all. Hence, there are good reasons to maintain
that passage through the Aland Straits is free only to the extent commonly
understood in 1921. Thus, ships of all nations enjoy the right of passage, whereas
aircraft are not entitled to overflight. Still, the Aland Straits may not be
completely excluded from the regime of transit passage. In the treaty of 1921 the
breadth of the territorial sea is fixed at three nautical miles. Since that treaty is
still in force and has not been modified, a right of transit passage at least exists in
the sea areas beyond the three,nautical,mile territorial seas.
Conclusion
Practice with regard to international straits has shown that States bordering
an international strait have continuously endeavored to assimilate the sea
areas concerned into their territorial sea or even internal waters. The majority
of these endeavors are inconsistent with the legal regime of international straits
as it has been developed by State practice and especially by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In and over international straits a right of
transit passage exists that shall not be impeded, whether in time of peace or
armed conflict. Of course, a belligerent is not obliged to leave unmolested
enemy vessels and aircraft transiting a strait overlapped by its territorial sea.
Neutral shipping and neutral aircraft, however, continue to enjoy the right of
transit passage. Neutral States bordering an international strait may prescribe
and enforce only regulations that are in conformity with the respective
provisions of Part III of the LOS Convention. Moreover, they are obliged to
counter any abuse of the neutral status of the respective waters by any of the
belligerents. They may, however, neither suspend nor in any other manner
impede the right of transit passage, even though observing the principle of
impartiality.
Of course, the law of maritime neutrality is far from settled. However, as
regards the legal status of neutral international straits, it is here maintained
that there exists a consensus adequately balancing the interests involved:
neutral States are protected from the adverse effects of the hostilities, and
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belligerents continue to enjoy the degree of mobility that is essential for the
success of their naval operations. In order to preserve that compromise it is
necessary to counter any effort aimed at a further restriction of the freedom of
navigation and overflight in and over international straits. Since international
straits are highly important traffic ways, every interested State should, starting
in time of peace, take all feasible measures in accordance with international
law to prevent any infringement of the legal regime of those sea areas. It may be
emphasized that to secure effectively the international legal status of
international straits it is in no way sufficient merely to rely upon one "lead
nation." Rather, all States concerned must, individually and collectively, take
the steps necessary.
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41. As early as 1954 Baxter came to the following conclUsion: "There is some basis for
concluding that a belligerent is under an obligation to provide passage, subject to reasonable
measures of security and control such as compulsory pilotage and navigation by day, to neutral
vessels and that it may completely block passage of a strait only as a last resort in the most urgent
and compelling of circumstances." Baxter, supra note II, at 204. Of course, this conclusion was
related to innocent passage, since transit passage was still unknown in 1954. For a contrary View,
see RAUCH, supra note II, at 45. Rauch merely acknowledges a belligerent right to subject
neutral shipping to "reasonable measures of security and control." This conclusion is, however,
not drawn from State practice but only founded upon the judgement in the Corfu Channel case.
42. For a characterization to that effect, see Heintschel von Heinegg, The Current State of
International Prize Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND ARMED CONFLlCf 5, 25 ff.
(Post ed., 1994).
43. Note that there exists no right of overflight in straits governed by Articles 36 and 38.1,
first alternative.
44. NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 9.2.3.3.
45. In this context, it suffices to mention Articles 34 and 39 of the 1923 Hague Rules on
Aerial Warfare, which can be considered customary law. See SPETZLER, LUFTKRIEG UND
MENSCHLICHKEIT 156 (1956). For a more cautious view, see Bierzanek, Commentary on the 1923
Hague Rules, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note II, at 396, 404 ff.
46. See CANADIAN ARMED FORCES, LAW OF ARMED CONFLlCf MANUAL (Second
Drafr), § 1521 (n.d.), [hereinafrer CANADIAN DRAFT MANUALI; Ronzitti, Crisis, supra note II,
at 25. This does not prejudice the legal status of civilian passenger aircraft.
47. See the ICAO Report, Nov. 7, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 900 (1989); Friedman, The Vincennes
Incident, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., May 1989, at 74; Evans, Vincennes-A Case Study, U.S.
NAVAL INST. PROC., Aug. 1993, at 49.
48. For example, the Swedish Ordinance of 1966, supra note 20.
49. Statement by the Swedish delegate during the third session of the second
subcommittee, july 27, 1907, printed in NIEMEYER, supra note 15, at 1009.
50. Reprinted in id. at 922.
51. While the Ottoman delegate referred to the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the
japanese delegate stated, "Le Gouvernementjaponais ne prenait aucun engagement concernant
les d6troits qui s6parent les nombreuses iies ou liots qui composent l'empire japonais et qui ne
sont que des parties int6grantes de l'empire." Id. at 893.
52. Report of Ocr. 9, 1907, reprinted in id. at 893.
53. In 1927 Jessup maintained that the applicability of the right of innocent passage to
international straits "requires no supporting argument or citation." He conceded, however, that
there was no general agreement with regard to warships. See JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL
WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDlCfION 120 (1927).
54. The same view was taken by Wehberg, Das Seekriegsrecht, in V HANDBUCH DES
VOLKERRECHTS 418 (Stier-Somlo ed., 1915). Rauch draws a different conclusion from the
conference history: "From the opinions expressed, it seemed that a neutral State may forbid even
innocent passage through limited parts of its territorial waters so far as that was considered
necessary to maintain its neutrality, but that this prohibition could not extend to straits uniting
two open seas." RAUCH, supra note 11, at 41. Rauch also refers to the statement of the
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Norwegian delegate concerning the right of innocent passage in time of war. However, that
statement contains nothing in relation to international straits; it is proof only for the customary
character of Article 10 of Hague Convention XIII. ROnzitti, Crisis, supra note II, at 19.
55. See the references in WHITEMAN, 11 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 ff. (1968)
(on State practice during armed conflicts before 1945).
announcements
and proclamations
are
printed in
56. The respective
REICHS-MARINE-AMT, SEEKRlEGSRECHT 1M WELTKRlEG (SAMMLUNG DlPLOMATISCHER
NOTEN UND ANDERER URKUNDEN. ZUSAMMENGESTELLT 1M AUFTRAGE DES
STAATSSEKRETARS DES REICHS-MARlNE-AMTSj, 3 vols. (1916); and in OKM, URKUNDEN ZUM
SEEKRIEGSRECHT, supra note 19. See also, RAUCH, supra note II, at 32 ff.
57. 188 L.N.T.S. 294-331.
58. See Articles 2.3 and 8.1 respectively for Denmark and Sweden. See also Bring,
Commentary on !he 1938 S!ockholm Deciara!ion, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note
II, at 839,891, who concludes that "the Danish and Swedish Regulations implicitly confirmed
the traditional right of unimpeded passage of foreign warships in time of war through the Baltic
Straits."
59. Note that the Harvard Draft of 1939 contains no explicit prohibition on closing neutral
international straits. There is only one reference to straits in the commentary on Article 25. That
commentary is, however, restricted to the Turkish Straits, the Suez, and the Panama Canal.
Otherwise, it is stated that the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice (PCI]), in the case of
the Wimbledon, ruled that the use of international waterways is in accordance with neutrality.
60. See Memorandum by the German Foreign Office of 6 June 1941, reprin!ed in OKM,
URKUNDEN ZUM SEEKRlEGSRECHT, supra note 19, no. 432.
61. For the few examples ofbelligerent warships transiting neutral international straits, see
O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 99 ff. (1975).
62. See the Swedish Ordinance of 1966, supra note 20, and the Danish Ordinance of27
February 1976 concerning admittance of foreign w~ships and military aircraft (U.N.
STILEGSER.B/19, 142). The Swedish Ordinance was revised by the Ordinance of 17 June 1982
concerning Intervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the Event of Violations of Swedish
Territory in Peacetime and in Neutrality (Swedish Code of Statutes 1982: 756). The restrictions
of the transit right of foreign warships and military aircraft does not apply in the Oresund, where
no prior notice is necessary. See also RAUCH, supra note 11, at 43 ff.
63. RAUCH, supra note 11, at 44. Rauch believes that "taken together, doctrine and State
practice would seem to justify the conclusion that if the littoral States are neutral, innocent
passage of belligerent warships through international straits in time of war may be interfered with
only in exceptional cases." See also 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (7th ed.,
Lauterpacht ed., 1963), who, by reference to an obi!er dic!um of the PCI] in the Wimbledon case,
claims an unrestrictable right of transit passage. The PCI] had mentioned "the general opinion
according to which, when an artiflcial waterway connecting rwo open seas has been permanently
dedicated to the use of the whole world, such waterway is assimilated to natural straits in the
sense that even the passage of a belligerent man-of-war does not compromise the neutrality of
the sovereign State under whose jurisdiction the waters in question lie." P.C.I.J. Ser. A., No.1,
28. A more cautious approach is taken by Castren, who states, "Transit by belligerent warships
may probably not, however, be prevented in those straits connecting different parts of the high
seas where the territorial waters of one or several neutral coastal States meet." CASTREN, THE
PREsENT LAw OFWARANDNEUTRAUTY 518 (1954).
64. In Article 17 ofits draft (U.N. Doc. N3159), the International Law Commission (ILC)
had proposed the following wording: "There must be no suspension of the innocent passage of
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foreign vessels through straits nonnally used for international navigation between two parts of
the high seas." Hence, in the final wording there is no longer a reference to the "normal use" for
international navigation.
65. See, inter alia, Alexander, International Straits, supra note 13, at 97 ff.; O'CONNELL,
INFLUENCE, supra note 61, at 103 ff.
66. 1 O'CONNELL, LAw OF THE SEA, supra note 29, at 317; KOH, supra note 29, at 27;
Reisman, supra note 29, at 59.
67. Note that the right of transit passage does not apply to internal waters within a strait
"except where the establishment of a straight baseline ... has the effect of enclosing as internal
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such." LOS Convention, supra note 2,
art. 35 (a). Although the legal status of internal waters within an international strait is of special
relevance for the Northeast and Northwest passages, the status of these sea areas is still unclear;
see the exchange of notes between the United States and the former USSR in DEPT. OF STATE,
LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, at 68 ff. (1992). See also Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest
Passage Dispute: A Reassessment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.]. 331 (1993).
Another open question is the legal status of the entries to an international strait if they are
completely overlapped by the littoral States' territorial seas. This is the case in the Strait of
Magellan and in the Beagle Channel. It follows, however, from the object and purpose of the
right of transit passage that there also exists a right of passage and overflight that may not be
hampered or suspended. This is the position taken by the U.S. Department of State vis-a-vis
Chile and Argentina. See LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, supra, at 63.
68. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 38.1. For an analysis, see Young, The Evolution 0/ a
Proposed New Navigation Rule: The "Duty Not to Impede," 17]. MAR. L. & COM. 119 (1986).
69. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 39.1 (a-c).
70. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 20
October 1972; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)
of 2 November 1973; International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of
1 November 1974.
71. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 39.2(a). Note that State aircraft "will normally
comply with s.uch safety measures." Id., art. 39.3 (a).
72. Id., art. 41.1.
73. Id., art. 42.2.
74. Bryde, Militiirische und sicherheitspolitische Implikationen der neuen Seerechtskonvention, in
DAS NEUE SEERECHT 151,176 (Delbruck ed., 1984).
75. See, inter alia, ROACH & SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 177 ff. (66
International Law Studies, 1994); MONcH, DIE REGIME INTERNATlONALER MEERENGEN VOR
DEM HINTERGRUND DER DRITTEN UN-SEERECHTSKONFERENZ 127 ff. (1982) (on the
customary character of the provisions).
76. Alexander, supra note 13, at91; RAUCH, supra note 11, at48; Robertson, supra note 28,
at 843 ff.; Moore, supra note 27, at 95; Clove, supra note 39, at 108 ff.; Burke, supra note 39, at
193; Bryde, supra note 74, at 176 E, 182 ff; MONcH, supra note 75, at 111 ff.
77. Alexander, International Straits, supra note 13, at 93; RAUCH, PROTOCOL
ADDITlONAL, supra note 11, at 45 ff.; ROBERTSON, supra note 14, at 21 f.; Dinstein, supra
note 37, at 19 f.; MONcH, supra note 75, at 44; Harlow, The Law o/Neutrality at Sea/or the 80's
and Beyond, 3 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L.]. 42, 50 (1984); Grunawalt, Belligerent and Neutral Rights
in Straits and Archipelagos, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: WHAT LIES AHEAD? 137 (Clingan ed.,
1988); Ronzitti, Passage, supra note 38, at 366 ff. See also para. 29 of the San Remo Manual:
"Neutral States may not suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede the right of transit passage ...."
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SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw ApPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICfS AT SEA ,
para. 29 (Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). Only Lowe seems to have doubts as regards the validity of
the right of transit passage during armed conflict. Lowe, supra note 39, at 123.
78. "Customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
provides that belligerent and neutral surface ships, submarines, and aircraft have a right of transit
passage through, over, and under all straits used for international navigation. Neutral nations
cannot suspend, hamper, or otherwise impede this right of transit passage through international
straits." NWP I-14M, supra note 9 § 7.3.5. "The airspace above neutral international straits ...
remains open at all times to belligerent aircraft, including armed military aircraft, engaged in
transit ... passage." Id., § 7.3.7.
79. "Warships and military aircraft of a belligerent state may exercise the right of transit
passage, that is, of essentially unimpeded passage or overflight •.. through certain straits where
the transit passage applies." CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL, supra note 46, § 1511.2.
80. "While transit passage through international straits ... include [s I the right of overflight
and the right of passage in submerged mode." ZDv 15/2, supra note 34, § 1126.
81. In the Danish background paper, supra note 35, the authors consider the legal status
unclear. It must be kept in mind, however, that that paper was written in 1978. Moreover, it is
made clear that "in the case of international straits the legality of a minefield will presumably
depend on whether passage of the straits by the belligerents is 'innocent' in relation to the peace,
order and security of the coastal State."
82. Harlow, supra note 77, at 50.
83. RAUCH, supra note 11, at 46.
84. NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 7.3.5. "The rights of transit passage ... applicable to
internarional straits ... in peacerime continue to apply in times of armed conflict. The laws and
regulations of States bordering straits ... relating to transit passage ... adopted in accordance
with general international law remain applicable." SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, para. 27.
85. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 40. See also, Alexander, supra note 13, at 93.
86. "A belligerent in transit passage through, under and over a neutral international strait
... is required to proceed without delay, to reftain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of the neutral littoral ... State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and otherwise
refrain from any hostile actions or other activities not incident to their transit." SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 77, para. 30. See also, Ronzitti, supra note 38, at 369 f.
87. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, paras. 15-17; NWP I-14M, supra note 9, § 7.3.5;
ZDv 15/2, supra note 34, § 1118 ff. For the Egyptian action taken in the strait ofBab al Mandab,
see O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 101 ff.
88. Alexander, supra note 13, at 93.
89. Hence, there is no difference with the applicable peacetime rule. In view of the
vulnerability of surfaced submarines, it would be unrealistic to prohibit submerged transit.
Moreover, the neutral State is thus not obliged to monitor the strait, which would necessitate the
use of expensive equipment. See Harlow, supra note 77, at 51 (1984); Ronzitti, supra note 38, at
370 ff.
90. CANADIAN DRAFT MANUAL, supra note 46, § 1511.2.
91. NWP 1-14M,supranote9, § 7.3.5.
92. Id., § 7.3.7.1.
93. "Belligerents passing through, under and over neutral straits ... are permitted to take
defensive measures consistent with their security, including launching and recovery of aircraft,
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screen formation steaming, and acoustic and electronic surveillance." SAN REMO MANUAL,

supra note 77, para. 30.
94. This may also be based upon the judgement of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case,
because the Court did not consider the transit of British warships, which had been in a state of
readiness, contrary to international law. 1949 ICJ Rep. 1 ff. See also, Harlow, supra note 77, at 51:
Because straits are natural "choke points," no naval commander can pass through without
being prepared to respond to hostile action. In the regime of transit passage, the concept
of peacetime transit in the "normal mode" includes the use of routine defensive measures
such as air and surface search radar, and sonar. In wartime, the use of such defensive
measures, which do not threaten the coastal state or its resource interests, is made even
more necessary by the heightened potential for imminent attack. Attempts by neutrality
laws to restrict such measures would be highly unrealistic and possibly counterproductive
since they could breed disrespect for the laws in general.
95. For example, common Article 8.2 of the 1938 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 57,
provides that" [al ircraft carried on board belligerent warships shall not leave such vessels while
in ••• territorial waters." There is no indication that this rule is not to apply in international
straits.
96. See O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 103 ff.
97. See also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, para. 30. "Belligerents in transit ...
passage may not, however, conduct offenSive operations against enemy forces, nor use such
neutral waters as a place of sanctuary or as a base of operations."
98. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 77, explanation of para. 30.1.
99. RAUCH, supra note II, at 49. The differences between international straits where the
right of transit passage applies and those where it does not apply are ignored by Ronzitri. See, e.g.,
Passage, supra note 38, at 363 ff.
100. LOS Convenrion, supra note 2, art. 45. See Alexander, International Straits, supra note
13, at 99, 103.
101. For example, Rnland still claims a territorial sea of four nautical miles in breadth. See
Law No. 463 of 18 August 1956j LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 29, No.2, March 1985. Therefore,
in the Gulf of Finland there remains an open corridor. The example given by Alexander
(International Straits, supra note 13, at 100) concerning the Bass Strait between Australia and
Tasmania is not valid any longerj on 20 November 1990 Australia extended its territorial sea
from three to twelve nautical miles. See the Statement by the Permanent Representative of
Australia to the UN of 29 November 1990, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 8, No. 18,
June 1991.
102. Alexander, supra note 13, at 100.
103. RAUCH, supra note II, at 47 f.j Alexander, supra note 13, at 99 f.
104. This is the case if the breadth of the remaining corridor is not sufficient for the safety of
navigation. An example given by Alexander (ieI. at 100) is the Bahamas. If the Bahamas
extended the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, the breadth of the remaining corridor in the
Providence Channel would measure 0.25 nautical miles. However, IMO requires a breadth of
three nautical miles in order to guarantee as safe a passage as possible.
105. RAUCH, supra note II, at 48. Rauch also refers to strategic submarines, which might be
unable to keep to the corridor simply because it is not deep enough.
106. leI. at 48.
107. The Strait of Messina between the Italian mainland and Sicily has a breadth of two
nautical miles. For the Italian position during the Conference, see the statement by the Italian
delegate reprinted in UNCLOS III, Off. Rec. 130. See also MONcH, MEERENGEN, supra note 81.

289

The Law of Naval Warfare and International Straits
108. Italy was supported by the British delegation. See UNCLOS, II Off. Rec., Vol. 125.
According to the British view, the following straits fulfil the conditions of Article 38.1., LOS
Convention: the Pendand Firth south of the Orkney Islands, and the passage between Cornwall
and the Scilly Islands. Hansard, 484 H.L., Feb. 5, col. 382.
109. For further examples (like Messina), see Alexander, supra note 13, at 101.
110. As of 3 April 1985, Italy has subjected international navigation to a number of
restrictions. Oil tankers of more than ten thousand tons may no longer transit the strait. Oil
tankers of more than five thousand tons and all other ships of more than ten thousand tons are
assigned to compulsory piloting. The United States, by a diplomatic note of AprilS, 1985, has
emphasized that it considers these measures only preliminary in character and not applicable to
warships; LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, supra note 67, at 68.
111. This provision has its origin in corresponding endeavours by Denmark, Finland, and
Turkey. See UNCLOS, III, Off. Rec. 124 f., 132 f.
112. In Article V, para. 2, of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979, reprinted in
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICf AND ITS REsOLUTION: SELEcrED DOCU~1ENTS 218 ft:
(Lapidoth & Hirsch eds., 1992), the two States have agreed as follows: "The Parties consider the
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations tor
unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect
each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba." While in view of the date of signature, that treaty will hardly
qualify as a "long-standing international convention," it is declaratory of the right of transit
passage as laid down in the LOS Convention. See also MONcH, MEERENGEN, supra note 75, at
53; Lapidoth, The Strait ofTiran, the Gulf ofAqaba, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and
Israel, 77 AM]. INT'LL. 99 (1983). Amore cautious view is taken by Alexander, supra note 13, at
102. See also Fink, The Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: The Practice of "Freedom of
Navigation" after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 42 NAVAL L. REv. 121 (1995).
113. See Moore, supra note 27, at 111 (1980); Alexander, supra note 13, at 101 ff.; Barabolja
in 1 MODERNES SEEVOLKERRECHT 230 (1978); ROACH & SMITH, supra note 75, at 177 ff.
114. Apart from the sources cited in note 113, see RAUCH, supra note II, at 50; LIUlTS IN
THE SEAS, No. 112, supra note 67, at 65. There is good reason to believe that the delegates to
UNCLOS III had these straits in mind.
115. Reprinted in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note II, at 437. For an analysis, see
Vignes, Commentary on the 1936 Montreux Convention, id.. at 468,472 ff.; MONcH, supra note 75,
at 45 ff.
116. Arts. 2-5. However, if Turkey is a belligerent, the Turkish Straits remain open for
neutral merchant vessels only-which have to travel by daytime, must respect the sealanes
designated by the Turkish authorities (art. 5.2), and are subjected to compulsory pilotage
(art. 6).
117. With regard to the passage of the Kiev in 1976, see Knight, The Kiev and the Turkish
Straits, 71 AM.]. INT'L L 125 (1977); MONCH,supranote 75, at47 ff. For State practice during
World War II, see WHITEMAN, supra note 55, at 277 ff.
118. For States bordering the Straits, the time limit is nine days; for all other States it is
fifteen days (art. 13).
119. If Turkey is a belligerent, art. 20 applies. For the wording, see supra, text following note
10.
120. Art. 19.2. Note, however, that this does not apply if, under the Covenant of the League
of Nations or another pact of mutual assistance concluded within the League's framework, there
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exist special obligations for Turkey. This presupposes that the State whose warships are to transit
the Straits is the victim of an act of aggression.
121. Martens, XVI NOUVEAU RECEUIL GENERAL 491 (1887).
122. Reprinted in LAw OF THE SEA BULLETIN, No.4, Feb. 1985, at 50.
123. That view is taken by RAUCH, supra note 11, at 52.
124. Hence, MUnch in his analysis of the Treaty of 1881 comes to the conclusion that that
treaty is a typical "long-standing convention in the sense of Article 35 (c) UNCLOS." MONcH,
supra note 75, at 53.
125. See the references in LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112, supra note 67, at 67; ROACH &
SMITH, supra note 75, at 194. See also note 36 to § 2.3.3.1 of the annotated version ofNWP 9, the
predecessor ofNWP I-14M.
126. The same position was taken by the U.S. Secretary of State in a statement of 21
December 1984 (reprinted in LIMITS IN THE SEAS, No. 112,supra note 67, at 67):
This long-standing guarantee of free navigation for all vessels has been amply reinforced
by practice, including practice recognizing the right of aircraft to overfly.... Essentially,
the USG position would be that the 1881 Treaty and over a century of practice have
imbued the Strait of Magellan with a unique regime of free navigation, including the right
of overflight. That regime has been specifically recognized and reaffirmed by both
Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Channel Treaty. Hence, the United States and other
States may continue to exercise navigational and overflight rights and freedoms in
accordance with this long-standing practice.
127. London Declaration by France and the United Kingdom concerning Egypt and
Morocco, art. VII, Apr. 8, 1904, reprinted in MARTENS, XXXII NOUVEAU RECEUIL GENERAL 18
(1905). Spain acceded on Oct. 3, 1904. Franco-Spanish Declaration of Mutual Assistance in
Mediterranean Affairs, May 16, 1907, 204 PARRY'S T.S. 353. Anglo-Spanish Declaration of
Mutual Assistance in Mediterranean Affairs, May 16, 1907, id. at 179. Franco-Spanish Accord
concerning Morocco, art. 6, Nov. 27, 1912,217 PARRY'S T.S. 288. Sometimes the Treaty of
Utrecht of 13 July 1713, by which Philip V ceded Gibraltar to England, is referred to. However,
art. 10 does not regulate the high seas corridor between Gibraltar and North Africa. Still, Spain
maintains that the provisions of the LOS Convention on straits do not apply to that sea area.
Upon signature, Spain declared that" [tJhe Spanish Government, upon signing this Convenrion,
declares that this act cannot be interpreted as recognition of any rights or situations relating to
the maritime spaces of Gibraltar which are not included in article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht of
13 July 1713 between the Spanish and British Crowns," reprinted in STATUS, supra note 32, at 25.
128. See TRUVER, THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR AND THE MEDITERRANEAN 179 (1980);
ROACH & SMITH, supra note 75, at 185 ff.
129. See the references in Alexander, supra note 13, at 102. See also Saenz de Santa & Paz,
Spain and the Law of the Sea-Selected Problems, 32 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 202 (1994).
When signing the LOS Convention, Spain declared: "It is the Spanish Government's
interpretation that the regime established in part III of the Convention is compatible with the
right of the coastal State to issue and apply its own air regulations in the air space of the straits
used for international navigation so long as this does not impede the transit passage of aircraft"
(supra note 127). According to the Spanish position, this recognition of the right of overflight is
without prejudice the to legal status of the Strait of Gibraltar because Spain has made clear that
its signature does not affect "the maritime spaces of Gibraltar."
130. Alexander, International Straits, supra note 13, at 102; O'CONNELL, supra note 61, at 98.

131. Ibid.
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132. See RAUCH, supra note 11, at 52. See also MONcH, supra note 75, at 52, who considers
the treaties obsolete.
133. MARTENS, NOUVEAU RECEUIL GENERAL, serie I, tome XVI, partie II, 345 ff. The
following States and entiries were parties to that treaty: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Hannover, the Cites of the Hanse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Netherlands, Oldenburg,
Prussia, Russia, Sweden-Norway, and the United Kingdom.
134. U.S.-Danish Convention on Disconrinuance of Sound Dues, 11 Stat. 719, T.S. 67.
135. DUring the deliberations on the LOS Convention, the Danish delegate declared that
"after negotiations with all interested parties his delegation was satisfied that Art. 35 (c) applied
to the specific regime in the Danish straits." U.N. Doc. NCONF.62/SR. 138, at 35 (1980). See
also U.N. Doc. NCONF.62/SR. 163, at 10 (1982). During the eleventh meeting of the Second
Committee the Danish delegate stated "that some straits, such as the Danish straits leading to
the Baltic Sea, had never been subject to the right of free passage but had been under a special
regime serving the interests of both the coastal State and the international community; such a
type of arrangement should remain in effect." UNCLOS III, Off. Rec. 124. For the Order of the
ICJ of29 July 1991 on Provisional Measures, see Gray, Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v.
Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of July 29, 1991,42 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 705 (1993);
Koskenniemi, L'affaire du passage par Ie Grand Belt, 38 ANNUAIRE FRANt;AIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 905 (1992).
136. The former USSR accepted the Danish regulations because it considered the Baltic
Straits excluded from the regime of transit passage by the Treaty of 1857. See also the references
in ROACH & SMITH, supra note 75, at 215 ff.
137. See note 36 to § 2.3.3.1, NWP I-14M, supra note 9; MONcH, supra note 75, at 50.
138. Rauch, DIE SOWJETUNION UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES SEEVOLKERRECHTS 81 ff.,
289 ff., 305 (1982). A more cautious view is taken by Bryde, supra note 74, at 187. For the
contrary view, see MONcH, MEERENGEN, supra note 75, at 51.
139. Supra text to notes 55 ff. (for the practice of Scandinavian States).
140. Ordinance Concerning Intervention by Swedish Defence Forces in the Event of
Violations of Swedish Territory in Peacetime and in Neutrality, supra notes 20 and 62. See also
Bring, supra note 58, at 841.
141. When signing the LOS Convention, the Swedish delegate declared:
It is the understanding of the Government of Sweden that the exception from the transit
passage regime in straits provided for in article 35 (c) of the Convention is applicable to
the strait between Sweden and Denmark (Oresund) as well as to the strait between
Sweden and Finland (the Aland Islands). Since in both those straits the passage is
regulated in whole or in part by long-standing international conventions in force, the
present legal regime in the two straits will remain unchanged after the entry into force of
the Convention.
Reprinted in STATUS, supra note 32, at 26.

142. Id.
143. See the declaration of the Finnish delegate during UNCLOS III, U.N. Doc.
NCONF.62/SR.135 (1980), at 8.
144. RAUCH, supra note 11, at52. For further references, see ROACH & SMITH, supra note
75, at 182 ff.
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